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Abstract
Time-based prospective memory (PM) is diminished under various task demands in individuals with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD). However, it is still unclear what underpins their impairment or how it could be remediated. This study 
explored whether instructions to prioritise one element of a PM task over another improved performance in adults with 
ASD (compared to a group of matched neurotypical adults), and how that is related to cognitive abilities. Results indicated 
that importance instructions significantly improved the PM performance of participants with ASD. Moreover, the extent of 
the benefit was associated significantly with objectively-measured executive set-shifting ability and self-reported inhibitory 
control ability (the poorer the set-shifting/inhibitory control, the greater the benefit). Implications for future research and 
clinical practice are discussed.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder · Prospective memory · Importance instructions · Executive functions · Mentalizing
The ability to remember to carry out a delayed intention or 
plan at the appropriate moment in the future is known as 
prospective memory (PM; Kliegel et al. 2007). When PM 
requires to be carried out at a particular future time point, 
it is referred to as time-based (TBPM; Kliegel et al. 2008; 
Kvavilashvili and Ellis 1996). TBPM encompasses both 
remembering to carry out an action after a certain time delay 
(e.g., taking medication 30 min after eating), or at a specific 
time point (e.g., taking medication at 7 pm). As such, TBPM 
facilitates successful completion of daily tasks, although PM 
failures are common in the population (Terry 1988) and can 
have adverse consequences (Woods et al. 2015).
One neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterised by 
problems with TBPM is autism spectrum disorder (ASD). 
Previous research has found that both children and adults 
with ASD perform less well on TBPM tasks (for a review 
see Landsiedel et al. 2017). These difficulties arguably con-
tribute to reduced everyday functioning and quality of life 
in ASD (van Heijst and Geurts 2015). However, to date, it 
is unclear why TBPM difficulties in ASD arise. This study 
explores the underlying causes of these difficulties by inves-
tigating ways to improve TBPM in ASD.
In laboratory experiments examining TBPM in neurotypi-
cal (NT) individuals, participants have to divide their atten-
tion between two tasks: an ongoing task (e.g., rating words 
on different dimensions) and a TBPM task, which usually 
requires participants to carry out a specific action at the 
appropriate moment (e.g., to press a response button every 
2 min) (Einstein and McDaniel 1996; McDaniel and Einstein 
2007). To successfully complete the TBPM task, partici-
pants need to monitor the elapsed time using a clock that is 
available on demand (e.g., by pressing another pre-specified 
keyboard key). A J-shaped function of time checks has been 
found to reflect strategic time monitoring processes (Mäntylä 
and Carelli 2006), with frequent initial time checks, followed 
by a period of few time checks, and then a linear increase in 
checks as the target time approaches. Thus, TBPM involves 
a series of self-initiated processes to enable PM retrieval 
(Einstein et al. 1995). It is thought that several elements 
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of executive functioning (EF) work together to support this 
process. Working memory supports the maintenance of the 
time-based intention while participants complete the ongo-
ing task and track the passage of time (Mioni and Stablum 
2014; Voigt et al. 2014). Inhibitory control, as well as cog-
nitive flexibility, are required to interrupt attention to the 
ongoing task (Kerns 2000) and either initiate a time-check 
(Mioni and Stablum 2014; Mioni et al. 2012; Vanneste et al. 
2016) or to execute the PM intention (Kliegel et al. 2002; 
Kliegel et al. 2003; Mackinlay et al. 2009). Finally, mental-
izing/theory of mind (the ability to represent one’s own and 
others’ mental states; Frith and Frith 2005) has also been 
implicated in TBPM, because it requires the ability to rec-
ognise one’s own intention to act (e.g., Williams et al. 2013); 
if one has difficulty recognising and reflecting on one’s own 
intentions, then it may be difficult to carry out one’s pre-
formed PM intention.
One critical aspect encoded during PM intention forma-
tion is the importance level attached to completing the inten-
tion (Kvavilashvili and Ellis 1996; Walter and Meier 2014). 
Thus, an intention’s importance will be a crucial determinant 
of successful PM performance in everyday life, as well as in 
experimental tasks. For example, collecting lifesaving medi-
cation for one’s child is likely to be undertaken regardless of 
the costs to one’s ongoing activities (e.g., even if it makes 
one late for work), whereas collecting one’s dry-cleaned 
clothes may not be important enough to disrupt one’s ongo-
ing daily activities for. In everyday life, the importance of 
completing an intended action will vary depending on per-
sonal (e.g., desires, goals, other intentions) and social (e.g., 
self- or other-generated intentions) factors. In lab-based 
experiments, however, perceived importance is based on 
how a particular task is instructed. Typically, participants 
receive a standard instruction; for example, “please remem-
ber to press this button in 2-min intervals”. However, no 
indication is usually given by the experimenter about how 
important the PM intention is relative to the importance of 
the ongoing task. In this context, participants need to infer 
the experimenter’s implicit expectation about how to per-
form a TBPM task alongside the ongoing task. Specifically, 
participants have to decide whether this instruction means 
that both ongoing task and TBPM task are equally important 
or whether either of the two is more important relative to 
the other. Thus, mentalizing also contributes to successful 
TBPM with regards to understanding the demands of others 
when they give TBPM instructions.
Crucially, relative importance of an intention (i.e., the 
importance of the intention to perform an action relative to 
the intention to perform a second action) affects PM perfor-
mance by increasing extrinsic motivation (doing something 
for external incentives/driving factors). This leads to changes 
in the strategic allocation of attentional resources towards 
the completion of the intended action, even if it is at the 
expense of other ongoing activities (Walter and Meier 2014). 
For TBPM, only one study has so far explored the effect 
of relative importance instructions on task performance 
(Kliegel et al. 2001). For the ongoing task, participants 
rated single words on one of four aspects (concreteness, 
familiarity, pleasantness, and seriousness). For the TBPM 
task, participants had to remember to press a pre-specified 
key in 2-min intervals. The task lasted just under 9 min and 
involved four PM target periods (at minutes 2, 4, 6 and 8). 
A PM hit was given if participants responded within ± 2.5 s 
of the respective target time. Half of the participants were 
told that the TBPM task was more important than the ongo-
ing task (PM high importance group), while the other half 
were told that the ongoing task was more important than the 
TBPM task (PM low importance group). Results revealed 
that emphasising TBPM had a large positive effect on PM 
hit rates (d = 1.14) due to the increased timeliness of the PM 
responses; i.e. more PM responses within the target interval 
(d = 1.11). Time monitoring was also increased in the time 
window close to the PM target time indicating a strategic 
allocation of attentional resources leading to higher PM 
accuracy. Interestingly, the costs of high PM importance on 
the ongoing task, defined as not giving a rating for a word 
on a given trial, were restricted to trials prior and after a 
PM target time, instead of having an overall effect on word 
rating performance. Other studies into the effects of relative 
importance have focused on a different type of PM (i.e.; 
event-based PM; e.g.; Loft et al. 2008; Smith and Bayen 
2004). This research further supports beneficial effects of 
emphasising the PM task over the ongoing task in typical 
development (see S1 for more details on these studies, or 
Walter and Meier 2014 for a comprehensive review).
Clear task instructions with regards to the importance 
of a delayed intention may be particularly relevant in ASD 
given their EF problems (Hill 2004; Kenworthy et al. 2008). 
For instance, individuals with ASD might struggle to inhibit 
attending to the ongoing task and to shift attention to the 
passage of time. A change in strategic allocation of attention 
might compensate these problems and lead to a performance 
benefit for individuals with ASD. However, only inconsist-
ent or no associations have been found between TBPM and 
measures of EF that are clearly associated with TBPM in 
NT individuals. Henry et al. (2014) reported associations 
of TBPM with a combined measure of inhibition and task 
switching whereas other studies found no association with 
cognitive flexibility or working memory in ASD (Williams 
et al. 2013; Williams et al. 2014). Hence, the underlying 
neurocognitive basis of TBPM difficulties in ASD remains 
unclear.
One explanation for the unclear role of specific EF for 
TBPM in ASD might be that it is not EF problems per se 
that cause poor task performance. White (2013) proposes 
that difficulties among people with ASD on many cognitive 
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tasks (particularly tests of executive control) result from a 
limited ability to infer the experimenter’s expectation for 
what is required on the measure (Triple I hypothesis). There-
fore, tasks that are unstructured, open-ended, or that require 
the inference of the experimenter’s implicit expectations 
will result in difficulties for individuals with ASD. White 
(2013) made this case specifically to explain the variability 
of performance on EF tasks in ASD. However, the Triple 
I hypothesis equally applies to TBPM tasks where partici-
pants are not explicitly told about the importance of the PM 
component. Mentalizing problems in ASD might result 
in difficulties to form a clear representation of the experi-
menter’s implicit expectation that carrying out the TBPM 
intention is a crucial part of completing the task, and thus 
result in TBPM impairments in ASD. Williams et al. (2013) 
provided tentative evidence for this idea.
Therefore, the main aim of the current study was to 
investigate whether manipulation of relative importance 
of delayed intentions would influence TBPM task perfor-
mance in ASD. Participants with and without a diagnosis 
of ASD completed two versions of a TBPM task in coun-
terbalanced order. One version emphasised the importance 
of the PM task over the ongoing task (PM high importance 
condition) and the other version emphasised the importance 
of the ongoing task over the PM task (PM low importance 
condition).
Depending on the mechanism of our main task manipula-
tion, two different predictions were made: (1) If problems 
with the executive demands of TBPM underlie poorer PM 
performance in ASD, a Group (ASD/NT) × Condition (PM 
high importance/PM low importance) interaction effect on 
TBPM performance would occur. Specifically, individuals 
with ASD would show increased performance from the PM 
low to PM high importance condition compared to NT par-
ticipants. (2) If problems with mentalizing underlie poor 
PM performance in ASD, benefits of task instruction would 
not be significantly greater in the ASD compared to the NT 
group.
We also furthermore explore potential cognitive corre-
lates related to changes in TBPM performance across condi-
tions. Behavioural measures of inhibition and cognitive flex-
ibility as well as mentalizing abilities were assessed. It was 
predicted that ASD participants with lower performance on 
these tasks would benefit more from the structure-enhanc-
ing importance instruction. Additional self-report measures 
were used to explore whether individuals who report poorer 
EF and PM in everyday life are those who will benefit most 
from the importance manipulation or whether the manipula-
tion has (if any) effects regardless of how individuals per-
ceive their own abilities.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-five participants with ASD (21 male) and 23 NT 
control participants (19 male) were recruited for this study. 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the 
School of Psychology at the University of Kent and partici-
pants gave written informed consent before taking part. All 
participants in the ASD group had a confirmed diagnosis 
of ASD according to standard diagnostic criteria (ICD-10, 
DSM-IV or DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association 
2000, 2013; World Health Organization 2006). Additionally, 
all participants with ASD undertook the Autism Diagnos-
tic Observation Schedule, second edition (ADOS-2, Lord 
et al. 2012), scores on which provide an indication of ASD 
severity. All participants completed the Autism-spectrum 
Quotient (AQ), a self-report measure of ASD traits (Baron-
Cohen et al. 2001). The established screening cut-off for 
ASD is a total score of 26 (Woodbury-Smith et al. 2005). 
Groups were matched closely for chronological age and gen-
der, as well as for verbal IQ, performance IQ, and full-scale 
IQ using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI-II, second edition, Wechsler 2011; see Table 1). 
Materials and Procedures
Prospective Memory Task
Participants completed two conditions of a computerised 
TBPM experiment in counter-balanced order to explore 
effects of importance instructions. The same ongoing and 
Table 1  Sample characteristics Group means (SD) T df p Cohen’s d
ASD (n = 25) NT (n = 23)
Age 34.84 (11.42) 38.24 (13.19) − 0.96 46 0.34 − 0.28
VIQ 105.20 (13.64) 104.35 (9.60) 0.25 46 0.81 0.07
PIQ 102.92 (19.39) 104.65 (10.81) − 0.38 46 0.71 − 0.11
FSIQ 104.32 (16.44) 104.87 (9.39) − 0.14 46 0.89 − 0.04
AQ 31.00 (9.06) 16.91 (6.75) 6.07 46 < .001 1.76
ADOS 8.80 (4.09)
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PM task was used in each condition. Each condition lasted 
for approximately 11 min and contained 40 ongoing trials 
and five PM trials. The conditions differed only in how their 
importance was instructed. In the PM low importance condi-
tion, participants were told that the ongoing task was more 
important than the PM task, whereas in the PM high impor-
tance condition instructions were reversed, i.e., the PM task 
was instructed to be more important than the ongoing task. 
Between the two conditions, there was a 45-min gap during 
which participants completed several filler tasks.
The ongoing task (see Fig. 1) followed the procedure pre-
viously used by Williams et al. (2014). Each trial consisted 
of a study phase and a test phase. In the study phase, partici-
pants had to memorise seven words which were presented 
sequentially in the centre of a computer screen. In the test 
phase, a list of seven words appeared for 4 s. Participants had 
to indicate whether all the words in the test list matched the 
seven words presented during the study phase, and to press 
the respective keyboard key in response (yes/no answer). In 
half of the trials, the words in the test phase were identical 
to those during the study phase and for the other half of the 
trials, one word was replaced with a lure item that had to be 
found. To ensure understanding of task instructions, par-
ticipants had to explain the task to the experimenter in their 
own words. Furthermore, participants had to complete five 
practice trials. The experimenter provided verbal feedback 
to the participant once the practice trials were completed. 
If a participant still expressed doubts about how to perform 
the ongoing task, the experimenter explained again and there 
was another chance to perform an additional five practice 
trials.
A score of one was awarded for each correct response and 
a proportion score (ongoing task proportion hits) was calcu-
lated, as the total number of hits relative to the total number 
of ongoing trials. For the analysis of the performance change 
between the two conditions, a difference score was computed 
by subtracting performance in the PM high importance con-
dition from the performance in the PM low importance con-
dition. A positive difference score indicates better ongoing 
performance in the PM low importance condition.
Two sets of 300 words were used as stimuli counter-
balanced across conditions (280 word stimuli plus 20 lure 
stimuli). Both sets were equated for frequency and syllable 
length according to Kucera and Francis (1967) guidelines 
and derived from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Colt-
heart 1981). The matching of the sets was confirmed using 
multivariate analyses finding a nonsignificant main effect of 
set, Wilk’s criterion, F(2,557) = 0.14, p = .87.
For the embedded PM task, participants were instructed 
to press a pre-specified keyboard key in 2-min intervals (PM 
target times at minutes 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10). To keep track of 
the time, a digital clock could be displayed on the screen 
(lasting for 1.5 s before disappearing again) by pressing a 
pre-specified keyboard key.
Retrospective memory for task instructions was checked 
after each condition, specifically participants had to correctly 
recall which of the two tasks the more important one was. 
All participants successfully retrieved the PM instruction.
The scoring of task performance followed that of Wil-
liams et al. (2014). A score of one was awarded for each PM 
hit. A PM hit was defined as pressing the pre-specified key 
within a 15 s time window around each target time (± 7.5 s). 
This scoring criterion ensured that a participant would have 
had enough time to respond to both the ongoing and PM task 
on any trial even if the PM target time fell in the middle of 
a trial (see Williams et al. 2014). A proportion score (PM 
proportion hit) was calculated as the number of PM hits 
out of five PM trials. Additionally, PM target accuracy was 
calculated as the mean of the absolute difference between 
the time of remembering the PM task (i.e., pressing the 
pre-specified key) and the target time across all PM hit tri-
als. For example, a PM hit at 2 min and 5 s (125 s) would 
result in a negative PM target accuracy for that trial of minus 
5 s. When averaging across all PM hit trials, the absolute 
value is used; e.g., |120–125 s| = 5 s for each trial because 
otherwise one would distort the mean by averaging across 
positive and negative values. A value of zero would indicate 
perfect accuracy (i.e., pressing exactly on the target time), 
and hence the bigger the value the further from target time 
the PM press happened. For the analysis of time-monitoring 
Fig. 1  Schematic depiction of the trial structure of the ongoing task
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behaviour, the five 2-min periods prior to each target time 
were each broken down into 30-s segments and the mean 
number of time checks in each time interval (0–30, 31–60, 
61–90, 91–120 s) across all five PM trials was calculated.
To assess correlates of change in TBPM performance 
from one condition to the other, difference scores were com-
puted for each of the dependent variables (proportion hit 
scores, target accuracy, and mean number of time checks in 
the critical fourth interval prior to target time) by subtract-
ing performance in the PM low importance condition from 
performance in the PM high importance condition. Positive 
difference scores for proportion accuracy and mean number 
of time checks indicate increased performance in the high 
importance condition (i.e., higher number of hits/more time 
checks in the PM high condition). Negative difference scores 
for target accuracy indicate that participants responded 
closer to target time in the PM high importance condition.
Self‑report Measures
Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function—Adult 
version (BRIEF-A; Roth et al. 2005): The BRIEF-A was 
administered to assess self-report everyday EFs. The BRIEF-
A consists of 75 statements describing specific behaviours 
and participants have to rate how often a certain behaviour 
has been a problem within the past month on a 3-point scale 
(‘Never’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’). Several subscales (Inhibit, 
Shift, Emotional control, Self-monitor, Initiate, Working 
memory, Plan/organise, Task monitor, and Organisation 
of materials) and summary scores (Behaviour regulation 
index, Metacognition index, and Global composite score) 
can be calculated. Of particular interest for this study are the 
Inhibit subscale (measuring the ability to control prepotent 
responses/inhibitory control) and Shift subscale (measur-
ing the ability to switch flexibly between activities or situ-
ations, to switch attentional focus; and to tolerate change). 
Raw scores were converted to age-normed T-scores (with a 
mean of 50 and a SD of 10) with higher scores indicating 
greater executive problems. Scores above a T-score of 65 are 
considered as potentially clinically relevant.
Prospective Retrospective Memory Questionnaire 
(PRMQ, Crawford et  al. 2003; Smith et  al. 2000): The 
PRMQ is a self-report measure of everyday memory slips. 
It is composed of 16 items probing for both retrospective and 
prospective memory difficulties. Participants have to rate 
the frequency of described memory slips on a 5-point scale 
(‘Very often’, ‘Quite often’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Rarely’, ‘Never’). 
Sum scores provide a general memory factor, as well as a 
prospective and retrospective memory score. Raw scores 
were converted to standardised T-scores (Crawford et al., 
2003), with higher T-scores indicating better memory.
Behavioural Measures
A computerised version of the colour-word Stroop task 
(Stroop 1935) was used to measure inhibitory control 
(Miyake et al. 2000). Participants had to indicate the cor-
rect colour of a word as quickly as possible irrespective of 
whether its meaning matched (congruent trials), mismatched 
(incongruent trials) or was unrelated to (neutral trials) the 
word colour. Inhibitory control was operationalised as the 
reaction time difference between correct responses to incon-
gruent versus congruent trials.
A computerised version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task (WCST; Berg 1948; Nelson 1976) was used to measure 
cognitive flexibility/set shifting (Miyake et al. 2000). Par-
ticipants had to sort cards that varied along three dimensions 
into categories according to an unknown rule using trial-by-
trial feedback. The sorting rule changed unbeknown to the 
participant after 10 correct sorts. The number of persevera-
tive errors was used as an index of cognitive inflexibility 
(i.e., a tendency to become stuck in set). A perseverative 
error was defined as persisting to sort a card into the same 
category as the previous one, after they had received feed-
back of their previous sort being incorrect (see Cianchetti 
et al. 2007).
The Animations task (Abell et  al. 2000) was used to 
measure mentalizing. Participants had to describe four short 
video clips. Each clip showed the interaction between two 
triangles. An accurate description of the scene required the 
attribution of mental states to the triangles. The accuracy 
of the descriptions was coded following the guidelines by 
Abell et al. (2000) with scores ranging from zero to two for 
each clip. Hence, the mentalizing total score ranged from 
zero to eight.
Further details of the behavioural tasks can be found in 
Supplementary Materials S2.
Statistical Analysis
An alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical sig-
nificance. Where ANOVAs were used, partial eta squared 
( 휂2
p
 ) is reported as a measure of effect size (≥ .01 = small 
effect, ≥ .06 = moderate effect, ≥ . 14 = large effect; Cohen 
1988). Where t-tests were used, Cohen’s d is reported as a 
measure of effect size (≥ .0.20 = small effect, ≥ 0.50 = mod-
erate effect; ≥ 0.80 = large effect; Cohen 1988).
Bayes Factor Analysis
An increasingly used alternative to power calculations is to 
calculate a Bayes factor associated with the critical result of 
interest. According to standard statistical conventions, if a p 
value for a specific analysis is > .05 then it can be concluded 
that the result is null and does not support the alternative 
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hypothesis. However, treating p values in this way assumes 
they are categorical and absolute, rather than “a conveni-
ent reference point along the possibility-probability contin-
uum’’ (Cohen 1990, p. 1311). Bayes factors overcome this 
issue by estimating the relative strength of a finding for one 
theory over another theory, allowing a more graded inter-
pretation of the data (e.g., Rouder et al. 2009). Thus, they 
are especially useful for interpreting null results, because 
they provide an estimate of the degree to which findings are 
supportive of the null hypothesis  (H0) over the alternative 
hypothesis  (H1) (Dienes 2014). Therefore, additionally to 
the traditional null hypothesis significance testing approach, 
Bayes factors were calculated. According to Lee and Wagen-
makers (2013) adjusted criteria of Jeffreys’ (1961) original 
criteria for interpreting Bayes factors, values larger than 10 
provide strong evidence for  H1, values between three and 10 
provide moderate evidence for  H1, and values between one 
and three provide anecdotal evidence for  H1. A Bayes factor 
of one does not provide any evidence in favour of either the 
 H1, or  H0. Values between one-third and one provide anecdo-
tal, between one-tenth and one-third moderate, and smaller 
than one-tenth strong evidence for  H0. Thus, Bayes factors 
between one-third and three provide inconsistent evidence 
for the respective hypothesis.
Bayesian analyses were computed using the software 
JASP (Version 0.10.0.0) using the recommended default 
objective prior for the respective analysis (JASP Team, 
2017; Wagenmakers et al. 2017a; b).
Results
Sample Description
Table 2 shows the groups’ performance/scores for the self-
report and behavioural measures of mentalizing and EF. 
Due to technical problems during data collection, only 21 
participants in each group completed the WCST, and 21 
ASD participants as well as 20 NT participants completed 
the Stroop task. Furthermore, only 22 NT participants com-
pleted the BRIEF-A. We ensured that participants in the 
experimental groups remained matched for baseline char-
acteristics before conducting the respective correlational 
analyses in these sub-samples. On both self-report meas-
ures (PRMQ and BRIEF-A), the ASD group reported sig-
nificantly more problems relative to the NT group, with large 
associated effect sizes. Lower scores on the PRMQ subscales 
indicate both prospective and retrospective memory prob-
lems in the ASD group. Higher scores on the two BRIEF 
scales indicate more executive problems in everyday life in 
the ASD group. Furthermore, the ASD group showed poorer 
cognitive flexibility on the WCST, as indexed by a greater 
number of perseverative errors. Finally, the ASD and com-
parison groups performed equally well on the Stroop and 
Animation tasks.
Ongoing Task
Table 3 shows the mean (SD) for ongoing task perfor-
mance among each diagnostic group. This data was sub-
jected to a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with Group (ASD/NT) 
as between-subject factor and Condition (PM low/high 
importance) as within-subject factor. There were sig-




 = .22,  BF10 = 33.08, and Condition, F(1,46) = 5.30, 
p = .03, 휂2
p
 = .10,  BF10 = 2.00. The NT group performed 
better overall than the ASD group, and both groups 
showed better ongoing performance in the PM low impor-
tance condition than in the PM high importance condition. 
No significant interaction effect emerged, F(1,46) = 0.17, 
p = .68, 휂2
p
 = .004,  BF10 = 0.28. The  BF10 for the additive 
model was 67.51 and for the full model 18.96. This means 
that the additive model provided the greatest evidence for 
the present data. Group differences on the ongoing task 
Table 2  Sample characteristics 
for behavioural and self-report 
measures of mentalizing, PM, 
and executive functions
There was some missing data for executive function measures. Only 22 NT participants completed the 
BRIEF-A, 21 participants in each group completed the WCST, and finally, 21 ASD participants and 20 
NT participants completed the Stroop task. Participants in the experimental groups remained matched for 
baseline characteristics for all correlational analyses. Sample characteristics for the remaining scales of the 
BRIEF-A can be found in Supplementary Materials S3
Group means (SD) T df p Cohen’s d
ASD NT
Mentalizing (animations task) 4.64 (1.82) 5.30 (1.82) − 1.26 46 .21 − 0.36
PRMQ prospective memory scale 40.60 (12.43) 50.96 (10.39) − 3.12 46 .003 − 0.90
PRMQ retrospective memory scale 45.56 (9.16) 53.61 (8.85) − 3.09 46 .003 − 0.89
BRIEF inhibit 63.40 (12.47) 51.82 (9.81) 3.50 45 .001 1.02
BRIEF shift 72.04 (13.82) 50.59 (8.16) 6.37 45 <.001 1.86
WCST perseverative errors 13.52 (10.98) 5.62 (4.40) 3.06 40 .004 0.95
Stroop inhibitory control 105.71 (88.14) 84.66 (134.47) 0.60 39 .56 0.19
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indicate that the ASD group might have had fewer atten-
tional resources to perform the PM task compared to the 
NT group. This could be problematic for the interpretation 
of any group differences in PM performance. Therefore, 
all analyses were repeated among a subsample that was 
matched for ongoing task performance as well as base-
line characteristics (see Supplementary Materials S4). 
Crucially, the results concerning PM performance were 
not substantially different in this subsample (matched 
for ongoing task performance) and in the full sample 
(unmatched for ongoing task performance). Therefore, 
the results from the full sample are reported here. The 




Table 3 shows the mean (SD) for PM accuracy for each 
diagnostic group. PM proportion hit scores were used as 
the dependent variable in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with Group 
(ASD/NT) as between-subjects factor and Condition (PM 
low/high importance) as within-subject factor. There were 




 = .19,  BF10 = 16.82, and Condition, F(1,46) = 18.09, 
p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .28,  BF10 = 141.50. More importantly, how-
ever, there was a significant interaction between Group and 
Condition, F(1,46) = 8.18, p = .006, 휂2
p
 = .15,  BF10 = 6.63 (see 
Fig. 2a). The  BF10 for the additive model was 2639.19 and 
for the full model 17503.47, indicating that the full model 
provided the greatest evidence for the present data. Tests of 
simple effects comparing PM performance within groups 
revealed that the proportion of PM hits was significantly 
higher in the PM high importance condition than in the PM 
low importance condition among participants with ASD, 
F(1,46) = 26.40, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .37, d = 0.86;  BF10 = 52.74, 




 = .02, d = 0.44,  BF10 = 1.20. Tests of simple effects of 
between-group differences indicated that ASD partici-
pants performed significantly less well than the comparison 
group in the PM low importance condition, F(1,46) = 12.81, 
p = .001 휂2
p
 = .22, d = − 1.05,  BF10 = 36.53. In the PM high 
importance condition, the ASD group again performed less 
Table 3  Ongoing and PM performance scores by group and condition
*n = 23 in each group
 Condition Group means (SD)
ASD (n = 25) NT (n = 23)
PM low importance
 Ongoing task proportion hits .65 (0.15) .78 (0.10)
 PM proportion hits .69 (0.34) .95 (0.09)
 PM target accuracy* 2.24 (1.60) 1.37 (1.05)
 Time checks 4th interval 1.70 (0.92) 2.17 (1.27)
PM high importance
 Ongoing task proportion hits .63 (0.12) .74 (0.13)
 PM proportion hits .91 (0.21) .99 (0.04)
 PM target accuracy* 1.66 (1.00) 1.02 (0.85)
 Time checks 4th interval 2.26 (1.02) 3.21 (1.67)
Fig. 2  PM performance by group and condition for: a PM proportion hits; b PM target accuracy; Error bars represent standard errors of the 
means. ***p ≤ .001, n.s. not significant
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well that the NT group, although the difference did not reach 
statistical significance and was associated with a Bayes fac-
tor that provided little evidence in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis, F(1,46) = 3.32, p = .08, 휂2
p
 = .07, d = − 0.53, 
 BF10 = 1.09. However, post hoc analysis showed that the 
proportion of PM hits among the NT group was non-sig-
nificantly below ceiling in the PM high importance condi-
tion, t(22) = − 1.00, p = .33, d = − 0.21,  BF10 = 0.34. Thus, 
while the finding that PM performance among participants 
with ASD improved significantly across conditions is valid 
and important, caution should be taken when drawing the 
conclusion that the ASD group improved significantly more 
across conditions than did the NT group.
PM Target Accuracy
Table 3 shows the mean (SD) for PM target accuracy for each 
diagnostic group. Two participants in the ASD group were 
not included in this analysis as they didn’t have at least one 
PM hit in each condition (ASD n = 23, NT n = 23). PM tar-
get accuracy was analysed in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA, with 
Group (ASD/NT) as between-subjects factor and Condi-
tion (PM low/high importance) as within-subject factor. A 
main effect of Group emerged indicating that the NT group 
overall responded closer to target time than the ASD group, 
F(1,44) = 6.94, p = .01, 휂2
p
 = .14,  BF10 = 4.20. Furthermore, 
a significant main effect of Condition indicated that both 
groups responded closer to target time in the PM high impor-
tance condition than in the PM low importance condition, 
F(1,44) = 6.36, p = .02, 휂2
p
 = .13,  BF10 = 3.21. However, the 
Group × Condition interaction did not approach significance, 
F(1,44) = 0.38 p = .54, 휂2
p
 = .01,  BF10 = 0.32 (see Fig. 2b). 
The  BF10 for the additive model was 14.43 and for the full 
model 4.59. This means that the additive model provided the 
greatest evidence for the present data.
Time‑Monitoring
Figure 3 shows the mean number of time checks carried 
out for each condition during each of the four time periods 
among ASD and comparison participants. A 2 × 2 × 4 mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on this data with Group (ASD/
NT) as between-subjects factor, and Condition (PM low/
high importance) and Time interval (0–30, 31–60, 61–90, 
91–120 s) as within-subject factors. The main effect of 
Group was non-significant, F(1,46) = 1.08, p = .30, 휂2
p
 = .02, 
 BF10 = 0.29. There were significant main effects of Con-
dition, F(1,46) = 23.01, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .33,  BF10 = 348.61, 
and Interval F(1.39,63.75) = 122.23, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .73, 
 BF10 = 2.02 × 1049. The Group × Importance interaction 
was non-significant, F(1,46) = .002, p = .96, 휂2
p
 < .001, 
 BF10 = 0.17, but there were significant two-way interac-
tions between Group and Interval, F(1.39,63.75) = 7.36, 
p < .004, 휂2
p
 = .14,  BF10 = 1230.52, and Condition and Inter-
val, F(2.11,97.19) = 9.09, p < .001, 휂2
p
 = .17,  BF10 = 4.84. 
Most importantly, all these effects were qualified by a sig-
nificant three-way Group × Importance × Interval interaction 
F(2.11,97.19) = 3.41, p = .04, 휂2
p
 = .07,  BF10 = 0.35. Of all the 
different models possible, the one with all three main effects 
and the two significant two-way interactions described above 
attained the largest Bayes factor,1  BF10 = 1.56 × 1059. Tests 
of simple effects revealed a significant between-group differ-
ence in number of time checks in the crucial interval imme-
diately prior to target time (91–120 s) in the PM high impor-
tance condition only; in this condition, significantly more 
time checks were made in the NT group (M = 3.21, SE = 29) 
than in the ASD group (M = 2.26, SE = .27), F(1,46) = 5.79, 
p = .02, 휂2
p
 = .11,  BF10 = 2.83. Furthermore, when compar-
ing time checks for each group, the ASD group checked 
the time significantly more often for three intervals (31–60, 
61–90, 91–120 s) in the PM high importance condition (all 
Fs ≥ 5.39, all ps ≤ .03, all 휂2
p
 ≥ .11, all  BF10 ≥ 5.05) compared 
to the PM low importance condition, whereas the NT group 
only checked the time more often in intervals 31–60 and 
91–120 (all Fs ≥ 4.48, all ps ≤ .04, all 휂2
p
 ≥ .09, interval 31–60 
Time interval (seconds)







































Fig. 3  Time-monitoring pattern by time interval in the ASD and NT 
group by importance condition
1 It is not possible within JASP to calculate the  BF10 for the model 
which is indicated based on traditional null hypothesis significance 
testing: main effects of condition and interval, two-way interactions 
between Group × Interval, and Importance × Interval, and the three-
way interaction Group × Importance × Interval of Importance. There-
fore, it is difficult to estimate what the additional three-way interac-
tion adds to the model in comparison to a model without it.
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 BF10 = 1.15, interval 91–120  BF10 = 24.39) in the PM high 
vs PM low importance condition.
Cognitive Correlates
Ongoing Task
Ongoing task performance was collapsed across condi-
tions for each group before being entered into correlation 
analyses. Additionally, to explore correlates of change in 
ongoing task hits between conditions, a difference score was 
computed (positive values indicating better ongoing perfor-
mance in the PM low importance condition). No relations 
between EF measures (indexed by self-reported EF problems 
on the BRIEF-A, as well as performance on the WCST and 
Stroop) and ongoing task performance or the change in per-
formance were found in either group. The only significant 
correlation was found between mentalizing and ongoing task 
performance in the ASD group (see Table 4). Therefore, 
ongoing task performance was partialled out when inves-
tigating the correlation between mentalizing and change in 
PM performance.
PM Task
Difference scores were computed for proportion hit scores, 
target accuracy, and time checks in the critical last inter-
val. Subsequently, a series of correlations was performed 
Table 4  Correlates of change (Δ) in PM and ongoing performance, and ongoing performance overall
Correlations significant two-tailed †p ≤ .06, *p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .001
Group Δ PM pro-
portion hit
Δ Target accuracy Ongoing task propor-
tion hits (collapsed)
Δ Ongoing task 
proportion hits
Δ I4 time monitoring ASD r .40* − .45* .05 − .12
BF10 1.62 2.21 0.57 0.39
NT r − 0.27 − .34 .23 .32
BF10 0.53 0.86 0.27 1.43
BRIEF inhibition scale ASD r .23 − .66*** − .15 .02
BF10 0.45 58.02 0.32 0.25
NT r − .16 − .12 − .24 − .23
BF10 0.33 0.30 0.46 0.44
BRIEF shifting scale ASD r .01 − .24 − .12 − .11
BF10 0.25 0.46 0.29 0.28
NT r − .25 .11 .07 − .31
BF10 0.49 0.29 0.28 0.67
WCST perseverative errors ASD r .61** − .19 − .25 .02
BF10 14.93 0.37 0.46 0.27
NT r .28 − .15 .22 .26
BF10 0.54 0.33 0.42 0.50
Stroop inhibition index ASD r <.01 − .26 < .01 − .17
BF10 0.27 0.49 0.27 0.35
NT r − .06 .04 − .20 − .30
BF10 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.58
Mentalizing score (animations task) ASD r − .27 − .15 .48* − .15
BF10 0.55 0.33 3.95 0.31
NT r .22 .35 .28 .33
BF10 0.41 0.95 0.58 0.78
PRMQ prospective memory scale ASD r − .10 .39† − .21 .18
BF10 0.28 1.32 0.40 0.35
NT r .08 − .12 − .03 − .07
BF10 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27
PRMQ retrospective memory scale ASD r − .05 .46* − .09 .19
BF10 0.26 2.68 0.27 0.36
NT r .09 − .37 .02 − .08
BF10 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.27
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between indices of TBPM performance change across con-
ditions and (a) time monitoring; (b) self-report and behav-
ioural measures of EFs; (c) a self-report measure of memory; 
and (d) a behavioural measure of mentalizing. Furthermore, 
correlations explored whether modulation of time monitor-
ing frequency was associated with any of these measures 
(see Table 4 for all the results of the correlation analyses and 
the associated Bayes factors).
The partial correlation between change in PM proportion 
hits across conditions and perseverative errors on the WCST 
controlling for non-perseverative errors was significant in 
the ASD (r = .47, p = .04,  BF10 = 2.36) but not in the NT 
group (r = .25, p = .29,  BF10 = 0.47). However, a Fisher z-test 
revealed that the size of the correlation in the ASD group 
was not significantly different from the one in the NT group 
(z = 0.76, p = .45). The partial correlation between change in 
PM proportion hits and mentalizing (Animations task theory 
of mind score) controlling for overall ongoing task perfor-
mance was not significant in either group (ASD: r = -.33, 
p = .11,  BF10 = 0.88; NT: r = .16, p = .47,  BF10 = 0.34). 
Finally, self-report problems of EFs on several clinical scales 
of the BRIEF-A correlated with PM target accuracy in the 
ASD group but not the NT group. Additionally, there was 
a trend that PM target accuracy in the ASD group corre-
lated with self-rated PM as well as self-rated retrospective 
memory.
Discussion
This study investigated whether emphasising the impor-
tance of PM affected task performance in ASD and how 
changes in performance related to behavioural and self-
report measures of EFs, memory, and mentalizing. There 
were several key findings. Emphasising the importance of 
the TBPM task over the ongoing task increased PM per-
formance of participants with ASD significantly. In the 
standard (PM low importance) condition, the ASD group 
showed diminished PM performance, in keeping with find-
ings from multiple previous studies (Altgassen et al. 2009, 
2012; Williams et al. 2013, 2014). Crucially, the change in 
PM performance among participants with ASD reduced the 
size of the between-group difference in PM hits from a large 
(in the PM low importance condition) to a small-to-medium 
sized effect (in the PM high-importance condition). In com-
parison, NT participants did not significantly increase their 
performance from the PM low to the PM high importance 
condition. Thus, the ASD group seemingly benefitted more 
from the experimental manipulation than the NT group. 
However, NT participants performed near ceiling in the PM 
high importance condition, which makes the true difference 
in the size of the between-group difference difficult to estab-
lish with certainty. What is more important though is how 
performance in the ASD group in the PM high importance 
condition compares to performance in the NT group in the 
PM low importance condition. This comparison indicates 
whether individuals with ASD are capable of achieving NT 
performance levels when using a specific strategy. Indeed, 
with respect to PM hits, performance among ASD partici-
pants in the high importance condition was equivalent to 
performance among NT participants during the low impor-
tance condition.
To our knowledge, only two previous studies have 
explored ways to improve TBPM in ASD. Altgassen 
et al. (2014) explored whether the use of implementation 
intentions as an explicit memory encoding strategy might 
improve TBPM in adults with ASD. In a more recent study, 
Altgassen et al. (2019) explored whether emphasising the 
importance for someone else (social importance) or receiv-
ing a reward (personal importance) would positively affect 
TBPM in adolescents with ASD. However, neither study 
found beneficial effects of their experimental manipulation 
on TBPM performance in ASD compared to NT controls. 
As such, this study is the first of its kind to show that TBPM 
in ASD can be improved.
In line with previous studies manipulating relative impor-
tance in typical samples (Kliegel et al. 2001; Loft et al. 
2008; Smith and Bayen 2004; Walter and Meier 2014), 
PM improvement in the ASD group was associated with a 
change in strategic time monitoring, and thus a change in 
attentional allocation. Specifically, the ASD group increased 
their frequency of time checks in the PM high importance 
condition compared to the PM low importance condition. 
Yet, the increase in the critical time interval prior to target 
time was lower in the ASD compared to the NT group. Strik-
ingly, the improvement in PM performance did not come 
at the cost of diminished ongoing task performance among 
participants with ASD. Thus, it was not the mere reallo-
cation of attention from ongoing task to the PM task that 
resulted in increased PM performance. Rather, emphasising 
the importance of the PM task made participants with ASD 
more likely to remember to carry out the planned action at 
the appropriate time all the while they were successfully 
completing the ongoing task.
These results imply that impairments on standard labora-
tory based TBPM tasks, as well as difficulties with everyday 
TBPM, among people with ASD arise partly from difficul-
ties with appropriately allocating attention to the PM task 
at hand. This is likely to reflect, in part, common difficul-
ties with executive control and planning in ASD (Hill 2004; 
Kenworthy et al. 2008; Lai et al. 2016; Landry and Al-Taie 
2016). Indeed, the results from correlation analyses sup-
port this interpretation. Among participants with ASD, the 
extent to which PM hits increased from the PM low to the 
PM high importance condition was associated significantly 
with the number of perseverative errors made on the WCST. 
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Hence, the more difficulties the participants had with cogni-
tive flexibility and shifting mindset, the more they benefitted 
from the emphasised instructions in the PM high importance 
condition. This is in line with a study that found a correlation 
between TBPM and switching in children with ASD (Henry 
et al. 2014) but opposite to Williams et al. (2013) who found 
no association between WCST performance and TBPM.
Similarly, the extent to which PM accuracy increased 
from the PM low to the PM high importance condition was 
associated significantly with self-reported inhibitory control 
among participants with ASD. Hence, the more problems 
participants reported with inhibiting prepotent responses, 
the more they benefitted from the emphasised instructions 
in the PM high importance condition. This finding was not 
reflected in a similar correlation with the Stroop inhibition 
index. It may be that the self-report measure is more sensi-
tive to inhibitory control problems relevant for PM in ASD 
that do not become evident in a structured lab-based inhibi-
tion task. Moreover, self-report inhibitory control problems 
are associated with independent adaptive functioning and 
quality of life (de Vries and Geurts 2015; Pugliese et al. 
2016) which PM is important for (Henry et al. 2014). Thus, 
elevated scores on the BRIEF-Inhibit scale above the clini-
cally interesting cut-off might be a tool to identify individu-
als with ASD who need more support with TBPM.
It is important to note that a large number of correlations 
were conducted in the current study, which inflates the risk 
of making type I errors. However, both of these significant 
correlations would remain significant if Bonferroni correc-
tions for multiple comparisons were applied (although see 
Perneger 1998, for arguments against applying such correc-
tions) and Bayesian analyses for the significant correlations 
suggested strongly that the data supported the alternative 
hypothesis. Overall, then, the results imply that supporting 
executive control processes by giving explicit instructions 
can positively support TBPM among people with ASD. 
These results extend existing research into importance 
instructions effects and are in line with results from other 
studies that reported beneficial effects on task performance 
of explicit instructions among people with ASD (Bowler 
et al. 2000). More generally, they are in keeping with the 
“task support hypothesis” (Bowler et al. 1997), which sug-
gests that individuals with ASD experience less memory 
difficulties when provided with cues to the to be remembered 
test stimuli. In the present study, a change in strategic time 
monitoring in the ASD group provided participants with 
more cues to PM retrieval. Therefore, it may be that the 
explicit importance instruction provides useful structure and 
scaffolding in managing dual task demands for participants 
with ASD leading to improved performance. This could 
be particularly useful in employment settings to alleviate 
communication and interactional difficulties (Hendricks 
2010), when individuals with ASD are required to manage 
multi-tasking demands (e.g., finishing a work report and 
being on time for a work meeting).
The results are also partly consistent with the Triple I 
hypothesis (White 2013) in that this theory maintains that 
diminished cognitive task performance in ASD often results 
from a failure to infer the experimenter’s expectation about 
what the participant is required to do to succeed on the task. 
However, contrary to the prediction that would stem from 
this theory, the extent to which PM performance increased 
across conditions was not associated significantly with men-
talizing ability. If the Triple I hypothesis could explain the 
TBPM difficulties seen in ASD, then those with the poorest 
mentalizing abilities should have benefitted the most from 
the introduction of explicit instructions in the PM high 
importance condition. The lack of a significant correlation 
between mentalizing ability in this sample of participants 
with ASD is not, therefore, consistent with this idea (and, 
indeed, is contrary to the finding of Williams et al. 2013).
Altogether, the results of this study provide initial evi-
dence that the explicit instruction of the importance of a 
delayed intention scaffolds TBPM task performance in adults 
with ASD due to a shift in executive and strategic monitor-
ing processes. Compared to previous attempts to improve 
TBPM in ASD (Altgassen et al. 2019; Kretschmer et al. 
2014), the manipulation of relative importance instructions 
in the current study resulted in a clear enhancement of PM 
task performance among participants with ASD. Thus, this 
approach is so far the most promising strategy to improve 
TBPM in this disorder. Future research could extend this 
finding in several ways. The current study found beneficial 
effects of explicit importance instruction under controlled 
laboratory conditions. However, a previous study (Altgassen 
et al. 2012) found significant ASD-specific PM impairments 
during a naturalistic breakfast preparation task. It would be 
interesting to establish whether the effect of importance 
instructions applies equally under real-life/naturalistic task 
demands as under laboratory task demands among people 
with ASD. Furthermore, previous research has found that 
PM decreases with age, which can be alleviated (e.g.; Hering 
et al. 2014; Zimmermann and Meier 2010). Thus, it would 
be important to compare younger and older adults with ASD 
to explore whether the importance manipulation is equally 
effective across different ages. Finally, it would be important 
to explore whether the execution of self-generated compared 
to other-generated (family, work colleague, experimenter) 
intentions differs in ASD. Related to this, future research 
should also explore how self-rated (personal) importance of 
intentions (Ihle et al. 2012; Niedźwieńska et al. 2013) affects 
PM performance. Exploration of these factors would provide 
further important insight into how to tailor task instructions 
in order to maximally benefit task performance of individu-
als with ASD.
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